US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has acknowledged the obvious: we live in a multipolar world, where influence is applied by multiple major powers, like the United States, China, and Russia, in their immediate geopolitical spheres and beyond.
But how did we arrive at this historical juncture, and how does a relatively small prominent nation like Australia survive in such a turbulent, uncertain and continuously changing world?
Over the past four decades, the global order shifted dramatically. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world. This period of US hegemony coincided with an era of economic optimism and sustained global growth, leading to increased international trade and mobility, a phenomenon known as globalisation.
The dragon in the room
The major beneficiary of globalisation was China, which in a relatively short time, became the largest world economy by purchasing power parity (PPP).
According to the Bank for International Settlements, globalisation fueled China’s economic expansion. At the same time, China played a key role in advancing globalisation through, among other things, trade surpluses. This has been complemented by a rising and influential Chinese middle class.
The 2008 financial crisis further weakened the Western economic dominant order, accelerating the shift toward a multipolar world. Countries such as Brazil, India, and Russia began to assert themselves globally, challenging the dominance of Western-led institutions.
China’s economic rise and growing international influence, alongside other emerging powers, began to expose cracks in US hegemony and challenged Western perceived exceptionalism and superiority.
Recent geopolitical events, particularly the war in Ukraine, have further reshaped global power dynamics, pushing the world toward a new economic, military, and strategic architecture.
This has cemented the importance of regional blocs, such as ASEAN, which are poised to play an increasingly significant role, exerting greater economic, military, and diplomatic influence.
Geopolitics in a fragmenting world
Glenn Diesen argues that nations gain power through technological advancement and influence, driven by the need to maintain leadership in geopolitical and geoeconomic arenas. As technology rapidly evolves, countries must navigate strategic advantages, threats, and ethical challenges.
While major powers like the US and BRICS+ nations face these pressures, nations like Australia must adapt and balance competitiveness with economic, military, and social concerns.
In his book Great Power Politics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Diesen identifies key drivers of the emerging multipolar world.
Firstly, Disruptive Technologies: AI, automation, blockchain, and biotechnology can potentially reshape global power dynamics by influencing trade, security, and governance.
Secondly, through Geoeconomics, regional powers can reduce reliance on foreign economies while making others dependent, increasing geopolitical leverage. Governments control economic activity through state intervention or corporate alliances. Such examples are the competing geoeconomic models of China, which is a centralised model, in contrast to the US’s corporate partnerships model.
Thirdly, Strategic Industry Intervention sees governments manipulating global value chains to secure high-tech industries. This can be seen as the way in which the Trump administration aims to decouple China from supply chains to strengthen domestic manufacturing.
Fourthly, Tech Giants and Economies of Scope, where companies like Google, Apple, Yandex, Alibaba, and Huawei attempt to control multiple industries by leveraging their technological platforms, reinforcing monopolies and geopolitical influence.
Finally, Great Power Politics and Political Communication emphasise that control over communication technologies shapes narratives and legitimizes power. This has led to the rise of ‘Sovereign Internet policies’, where states assert control over digital discourse, challenging the stability of liberal democracies. As technological disruption intensifies, nations must choose between tighter control or potential internal instability.
Australia’s response to geopolitical and geoeconomic disruption
Australia is facing significant challenges due to pressures from allies like the US, particularly regarding potential tariffs. Additionally, emerging and established regional players are adding new geopolitical demands, thus creating further challenges. For Australia, the key question is how to respond effectively to these difficulties.
John Mearsheimer argues that international relations exist in a state of anarchy. This equates to a system without an overarching authority to mediate and resolve conflicts. While institutions like the United Nations exist, they lack the mandate or power to enforce solutions.
To manage this uncertainty, great powers develop offensive-defensive military capabilities, including economic, diplomatic, and covert strategies. These capabilities aim to minimize risk in a world where states act in their self-interest and therefore, cannot fully trust each other. As a result, nations seek power and wealth to secure their survival, often leading to competition and conflict.
While this prognosis sounds rather gloomy and risky, opportunities arise out of a self-evaluation of Australia’s strengths, opportunities, weaknesses and threats.
During the Hawke-Keating years, Australia saw the importance of strong and productive engagement with Asia. However, this impetus waned over the decades, resulting in successive governments providing a muddled foreign policy that lacks strategy, direction, and focus.
As the world transitions into a multipolar order, Australia faces numerous challenges requiring strategic adaptation. Australia benefits from robust democratic and economic institutions, contributing to its stability and resilience. With strong governance and transparent regulation, the nation ranks as the world’s 12th-largest economy. Its financial markets and banking institutions are highly sophisticated and solid.
Natural resources and technological expertise further enhance Australia’s position. As a leader in the supply of mineral resources, the country has a diversified export portfolio including education, healthcare, and finance. Its expertise in agricultural technology is strengthened by vast arable lands.
Infographic from the Australia’s Identified Mineral Resources (AIMR) 2024 report
Externally, Australia has established strong diplomatic and defence ties with key allies such as the US, India, the UK, Japan, and New Zealand. Security partnerships, including AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, bolster its regional security. As a founding member of APEC and a dialogue partner in ASEAN, Australia maintains significant economic influence through multiple free trade agreements (DFAT).
Geographically, Australia’s ‘tyranny of distance’ or relative isolation provides a natural buffer from conflicts. Additionally, its strong democratic institutions and independent public services ensure effective governance, contributing to national stability and investor confidence.
Despite its strengths, Australia faces several internal and external weaknesses. One major challenge is the slow adoption of new technologies. For instance, Australia’s mobile telecommunications sector, once a global leader, is at risk of falling behind due to delays in adopting 5G infrastructure. Cybersecurity remains a critical vulnerability, while at the same time it struggles to regulate major US tech companies such as Meta, X, or Google.
Australia’s vast coastline presents challenges in border security, particularly in combating illegal fishing and maritime threats. The Department of Home Affairs highlights the difficulty in patrolling territorial waters and managing risks such as human trafficking and piracy.
In terms of defence, Australia remains heavily reliant on the US. While the alliance appears strong, commentators question whether the US would intervene militarily if Australia were attacked. Additionally, the ANZUS treaty lacks a binding commitment to collective defence, raising uncertainties about Australia’s security framework.
Australia has numerous opportunities to strengthen its position in emerging geopolitical and technological fields. Space exploration is a key sector for collaboration with nations such as the US, India, and China. The International Space Investment Initiative supports research partnerships, which could enhance Australia’s technological expertise and economic influence.
Attracting skilled migrants is another major opportunity. By encouraging migration of high-quality professionals, Australia can bolster its workforce, drive innovation, and enhance competitiveness in the global economy.
Similarly, strengthening technological partnerships in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and biotechnology would position Australia as a leader in these fields.
Economic diversification is crucial for resilience. Expanding trade partnerships beyond traditional allies, particularly with Latin America and BRICS nations, could provide new investment avenues.
Australia can also lead in green technology, aligning with global efforts to combat climate change. By investing in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure, and carbon reduction, the country can attract investment and create new export markets while enhancing its geopolitical standing.
Economic threats stem from Australia’s reliance on non-green technologies and a weak manufacturing sector. Dependence on imports leaves Australia vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. Developing domestic manufacturing and investing in sustainable energy solutions could mitigate these risks.
A significant geopolitical challenge could arise if the US reneges on its ‘perceived defence partnership’ with Australia. This situation brings to mind Kissinger’s famous line: “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal”. The isolation of Ukraine by the Trump administration is a case in point!
Finally, as BRICS nations appear to be moving toward alternative currencies, Australia may need to diversify its currency reserves and trade partnerships to reduce dependence on the US dollar.
The global landscape that is emerging is likely to be marked by conflict, making life on Earth increasingly uncomfortable, unstable, and unpredictable. This evolving situation may lead to heightened anxiety, unpleasantness, and potential danger for many nations, regions, and individuals worldwide.
The US’ primacy as the global hegemon is being challenged by China’s economic and military power, while other influential regional players like Russia are also opposing Western liberal supremacy.
These transformations present both challenges and opportunities for mid-sized nations like Australia. While the world may seem increasingly dangerous and uncertain, Australia possesses the ability and capacity to adapt to a multipolar world.
As an independent actor, Australia can strengthen its government institutions, improve existing partnerships, build new ones, and exploit its advantages. These actions may open up numerous opportunities in a world that is in turmoil and rapidly changing.
Professor Alexis Esposto, Dean at Danford Higher Education, is a distinguished economist with expertise in geopolitics, international trade, labour economics, and regional development. His research focuses on geopolitics and trade expansion between Australia, China, ASEAN, and Latin America, exploring geopolitics, institutional theory, trade flows, and SME export strategies. With over 70 publications, including books and journal articles, he has presented at major conferences worldwide.
Note: This paper is a revised version of the following journal article: https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/full/10.1142/S2630531324500082?srsltid=AfmBOoorWsG6kHO3Fc__5PV5k22gd0xd8mXZtXmcjyL6ZHS1SMk_HX6t
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Eric Arthur Blair
2025-03-06 at 21:28
“To be an enemy of the US is dangerous, to be an ally is fatal”.
Australia is huge land-wise (mostly barren desert) but tiny population wise.
Culturally Australian lips are surgically attached to the US arse.
OTOH the USA views Oz with disdain as a subservient lapdog or stooge or lily pad on which to locate ISR (Pine Gap) or missiles or military bases (especially Darwin).
Brainless Oz alliance to the US will prove fatal to Oz, either by nuclear armageddon or by exorbitant economic exploitation (eg AUKUS = USUKA in which Oz is the sucker), or death by a thousand economic cuts.
Tethering the puny Oz dinghy to the sinking USS Titanic guarantees economic (if not literal) death Downunder.
Compliance with the US policy of shutting Huawei out on bogus grounds has paralysed Australia’s ability to move forward with 5G. If Oz complies with the US policy to hypertariff Chinese E.V.s, it will hobble Australia’s ability to move forward with renewable energy vehicles. No affordable electric vehicles for Australians in a world with rising oil prices, but Oz suckers can still buy Teslas at 3 times the BYD cost, to get inferior cars that can be disabled at Elon’s whim. Just as Europe lost its ability to buy cheap pipeline gas from Russia and now has to buy US LNG at more than 6 times the cost.
Oz sorely needs intercity high speed electric rail powered by renewable energy, which Oz has in abundance, and the only realistic, affordable contractor for that is China. This will never happen due to a misbegotten and fatal alliance with the USA, a dying empire which manufactures nothing of value anymore, only overpriced, underperforming weaponry to be “sold” to countries like Ukraine (which will be in debt to the USA forever) to fight a proxy war that was PROVOKED by the USA.
Re: AUKUS (=USUKA):
Australia signed an agreement with France in 2016 to pay USD$55 billion (AUD $90 billion) for 12 diesel-electric submarines to be built by South Australian workers. The engines could be maintained by Australians. “Scotty from Marketing” Morrison, Prime Monster in 2021, unilaterally reneged on this French deal WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC CONSULTATION and without any disclosure what the new US deal for 8 nuclear submarines (with power systems that could only be maintained by US workers) would cost.
Penalty to pay France for Oz violating the contract was $835 million, after Oz had already spent $3.4 billion on the French designed submarines. Money all down the toilet.
Only under the later Albanese government did Australians find out that the AUKUS deal would cost Australia $368 BILLION for 8 submarines (now amended to “six to eight” submarines, which of course, means six) which will largely be built by either the UK or US, thus depriving Australians of manufacturing jobs.
Other than turning Australia into nuclear target, what does this mean for Australia?
France had previously redesigned their nuclear subs to meet the Oz diesel electric requirement and it would have been a simple matter to modify the Oz order back to the original French nuclear design, which is powered by low enriched uranium, only 6%, yes SIX PERCENT uranium, which CANNOT be used in nuclear bombs. OTOH US nuclear submarines use >95% highly enriched uranium which can be DIRECTLY used for nuclear bombs which would VIOLATE Austalia’s agreement to the NPT, the international nonproliferation treaty. Furthermore even if the re-re-designed 12 French submarines would cost Australia an extra $90 billion ie a total of $180 billion, this would still be HALF the cost of the 6 US submarines and a QUARTER of the US cost on a per submarine basis.
Oz is now supposed to pay the USA $278 billion MORE than it would have paid France under the original sub agreement, ignoring the $3.4 billion + $835 million of already sunk costs, money for nothing.
What could $278 billion buy Australia?
Estimated cost for Oz to convert to 100% renewable energy is $100 billion and for high speed rail between all the major cities is $130 billion.
https://reneweconomy.com.au/for-100-billion-australia-could-have-a-low-cost-and-reliable-zero-emissions-grid/
https://grattan.edu.au/news/high-speed-rail-dreaming-is-a-fast-track-to-nowhere/
This would leave Australians with $43 billion in spare change to spend on health care, education and social housing.
Australians have been royally SCAMMED by AUKUS thanks to an obsequious CORRUPT Morrison* and now cowardly complicit Albanese. With “leaders” like that, who needs TRAITORS? With “friends” like the USA, who needs ENEMIES?
*Morrison now works for American global strategies as a non-executive vice chairman, laughing all the way to the bank.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6j_juP2UdkE&t=278s
Paul Keating, the last decent Oz Prime Minister, said it plainly
https://consortiumnews.com/2023/03/17/a-sane-voice-amidst-the-madness/
Eric Arthur Blair
2025-03-06 at 21:40
other links:
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-06-11/albanese-submarine-deal-with-france/101145042
https://sgs.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/2021-11/vonhippel-2021-aukus.pdf
French nuclear subs use only 6% LEU